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Abstract
In the search for a viable 21st century cost-sharing contract between university, student
and state, the issues of rising participation and student demand, functional
differentiation, institutional competition and stratification and social inequality are
systematically discussed. The argument develops through, firstly, a critical appraisal of
the genre of elite, mass and universal higher education; secondly, a discussion of the
consequences of US institutional stratification; and, thirdly, an assessment of national
tuition fee systems as a way of sponsoring mass and universal participation. The Ivy
League and the California Master Plan as well as the tuition fee systems in Australia,
New Zealand and England have addressed rising participation and relative declining
state funding (per FTE tertiary student) while seeking to preserve and enhance quality
by mobilising and concentrating resources. Yet, the accumulated unintended
consequences of theses systems are undermining their very foundations, making none of
these a suitable candidate for emulation in the 21st century. Moreover, the conceptual
distinction between, elite, mass and universal higher education is flawed and not
suitable for guiding further reform initiatives. Consequently, it is submitted that the
financing of state funded undergraduate degrees (BA) be decoupled from postgraduate
degrees (MA, PhD). The rise of the European Higher Education Area with 46 member
states, and more expected to join, serves as a vantage point from which to critique the
legacy of the 20th century and develop preliminary policy recommendations for the 21st
century.
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31. The university as a higher education provider: on participation and
funding after World War II
The university has become a higher education provider.1 The function of higher
education continues to attract patronage from the state. Universities may
complain about under-funding, but they do not wish to go without state monies.
Ever since citizens have been entitled to enrol once they have obtained the
necessary qualifications, participation has been on the rise (in terms of the age
grade that enrols after completing secondary education, the adult population as
a whole and the number of professionals opting for recurrent higher education).
Whereas participation was miniscule at less than 1% of the age grade until the
early 20th century, during the 21st century participation rates will rise above
50%, 60% or even 70% of the age grade, plus recurring enrolment for new and
further degrees over a lifetime.
Thinking about participation and access has been promoted and curtailed by
the distinction of elite, mass and universal higher education.  The connotation is
elite university, mass higher education and universal tertiary education. The
elite university is home to a select and distinct minority. Higher education is
conceptualised as a continuation of primary and secondary education, but it
preserves a whiff of distinction. However, mass higher education has pejorative
connotations and, characteristically, entails the spread of state-sponsored non-
university institutions that are cheaper to run. Universal higher education
sounds democratic, and the sculptors of the distinction between elite, mass and
universal higher education may have imagined that they were merely clarifying
what great sociologists described as the overriding trend towards
rationalisation, specialisation and democratisation, but universal higher
education is envisioned as little more than a continuation of secondary
education, linked to labour market specialisation.
Proponents of the distinction of elite, mass and universal higher education are
concerned to preserve elite universities. Two assumed ideal solutions exist:
California and the Ivy League. California, in 1960, codified a tri-partite division
between the elite University of California, the mass California State University
and universal access through community colleges. The divisions are absolute.
While students and academics may move between institutions, the institutions
themselves cannot alter their fate. Only the University of California awards
doctorates and, hence, research monies are pumped into this select group. The
Ivy League embodies the ideal of the private elite university. Yet, while their
status has much to do with high tuition fees and large donations, these
institutions would be nothing without federal research and student aid
programmes. However, the ensuing stratification of the Ivy League has become
so marked that the wealthiest universities are on their own, residing in a league
that fellow Ivy League institutions cannot enter into of their own accord. While
fully recognising merit and success, this paper will show that neither California
nor the Ivy League is a model for the 21st century.
4Table I - Universal higher education with a participation rate above 60%: overall expenditure on
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1.7% (All) 12.3% 30.1%
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M 62 / F 82







M 54 / F 78
N/a N/a 47.7%
USA 64 (All)
M 60 / F 68
2.7% (All) 66.0%* 37.4%
Source: OECD (2004) Education at a Glance, data from 2001 or 2002.
Elite higher education has always presupposed personal wealth or a substitute
such as scholarships or credit. Resources must not only be sufficient to devote
all time to study and university life, but also to participate in the exchanges,
excursions and dinner parties that are essential to elite education. Once the
nation-state discovered the university as an institution for manpower planning
and industrial innovation, more monies flowed from the state to the universities.
National systems of higher education emerged. However, once participation
rose substantially, national systems became increasingly expensive. Cost-
sharing gained currency. National systems of higher education are premised on
the notion of education as investment that brings return. While warring nation-
states may be fixated on manpower planning, economically competitive nation-
states find it opportune and rational to limit the direct funding of higher
education. Instead of raising taxes, governments charge tuition fees. The late
20th century saw the rise of a discourse on the societal versus the individual
return to higher education. This facilitated and justified the idea that students
ought to be charged tuition fees in accordance with the private return that
accrued to them over and above any social return.
The master narrative was provided by human capital theory. Within its
framework, the overall rates of return, and their rise and fall, could be measured
and debated. The relative rates of private versus social returns could be gauged
and disputed. Depending on the classification and interpretation of data, a case
could be made for, or against, tuition fees of a certain amount. A preferred
solution for cost sharing emerged: The deferred payment of tuition charges,
based on income-contingent loans. The history of such experiments (e.g.
Australia, New Zealand) shows that tuition fees, and rising tuition fees, may be
5accompanied by rising participation and even by rapidly rising participation.
Cost-sharing by means of a national tuition fee system takes away constraints
on demand, easing the expansion of higher education beyond 30%, 40% and
50% of the age grade. With reference to the distinction between elite, mass and
universal higher education, tuition fee advocates call for differential charging
(based on an assumed market for higher education or, at least, market-like
mechanisms). Differential charging is seen as both efficient and equitable since
those that may be presumed to reap a higher private return are paying higher
fees. Yet, this paper will show that once participation increases significantly, the
universal tuition fee, because of recurrent higher education with consecutive
and multiple postgraduate degrees, becomes a sub-optimal solution.
Beyond national systems and elite institutions: for a new contract between
university, student and state
Private higher education institutions must charge tuition fees but unless they
receive public research monies (e.g. USA, Canada), they are financially
disadvantaged by comparison to the state-sponsored research university.
Moreover, when states govern universities, they often withhold the appellation
‘university’ from non-state institutions (e.g. Japan, Korea and Poland). Non-elite
private higher education spreads only if student demand exceeds state supply.
While student demand may be satisfied, the combination of heavily subsidised
state higher education and private mass and universal higher education is
inequitable and inefficient.
A welfare state may endeavour to sponsor widened access and recurrent
participation without charging tuition fees, possibly even subsidising living
expenses by a grant and credit scheme with income contingent repayment. Yet
such a state inevitably curtails demand (e.g. Denmark, Sweden) and often
sacrifices quality too (e.g. Austria, France, Germany and Italy). Supply
shortages and high staff-to-student ratios are known to disadvantage the so-
called non-traditional students with regard to access and degree completion. A
supplementary contribution (e.g. Austria, some German Länder) does little to
alter the situation.
Significant initiatives to widen access and improve quality by cost-sharing have
only been undertaken in countries with public-autonomous or historically mixed
private and public higher education. In national systems, the parliament may
pass laws establishing substantial tuition fee charges (Australia 1989) and may,
additionally, mandate (New Zealand 1991) or allow (England 2005) differential
charging. As students have access to loans, with deferred and income-
contingent repayment, living costs may also be covered. These national
systems were designed by economists, policy advisors and labour politicians to
satisfy the criteria of efficiency and equality. Economists are supportive of the
schemes, save that some call for diminished state control, the inducement of
more institutional competition and the attachment of public subsidies to the
student’s choice (cf. Jacobs and Ploeg 2005). While fully recognising merit and
success, this paper will show that national tuition fee systems are not the
preferred cost-sharing model for the 21st century.
6The intention of this paper is to shift research and debate away from the focus
on state-governed and –funded higher education by suggesting that a new set
of contracts between university, student and state is emerging. This is the long-
term consequence of, firstly, rapidly rising participation in under- and
postgraduate education coupled with declining state funding measured in
resources available per student, and, secondly, of increasing international
student mobility, which makes tax-funded higher education problematic. Rising
participation and internationalisation increasingly have a ‘qualitative’
consequence in fostering the rise of institutional autonomy. Universities
compete for tuition fees and talent, while states seek to reduce their
commitments to fund and govern higher education. Given the interrelation
between declining state commitment and the increasing diversification of
university income, one may expect the trend towards institutional autonomy to
be self-reinforcing and long-term.
If this assumption is true, then the following issues become salient:
• State planned participation versus student demand: Whereas the state
planned for the expansion of higher education after World War II, the 21st
century will see universities responding to student demand.
• State induced stratification versus institutional competition: Whereas
institutional stratification has been induced by the state (so-called
‘historic funding’) after World War II, the 21st century will see states
regulating for fair competition between universities by ensuring equal
legal and financial status.
• State regulated cost sharing versus the value of teaching and learning:
Whereas state have been seeking to share costs by introducing tuition
fees, autonomous universities of the 21st century will seek to capture the
value of their higher education.
Higher education is on the way to becoming a set of contracts between
university and student. It is a set of contracts because it does not only comprise
teaching and learning (as higher education is traditionally defined) but also
encompasses finance, fellow students and alumni association. The state may
be a partner in this set of contracts. The state’s main mission will be to
guarantee needs-blind admission, it’s obligation will to be regulate for fair
competition and insofar as the state directly funds institutional study places or
student living costs, it is likely to do so according to output and performance
criteria.
The paper seizes on the Bologna process as an opportunity to advance a
critique of 20th century solutions while offering a vision of how rising
participation and internationalisation might lead to a new set of higher education
contracts, more efficient and equitable, and a new finance regime, that
recognises and supports institutional autonomy. The argument proceeds by
offering a comprehensive strategic, historic and situational critique of the
current regime of national systems, elite institutions and tuition fees. A sketch of
a possible alternative regime for the European Higher Education Area follows.
The critique constitutes the main part of the argument because the present
regime is entrenched and, although faulty, is not bound not collapse. The
sketch of the alternative regime follows from assumption (above) and critique
7(below) and is itself strategic, historical and situational. Though it addresses the
European Higher Education Area, it may be realised independently by any
country, region or university.
2. Strategic critique: participation rates and the genre of elite, mass and
universal higher education
The genre of elite, mass and universal higher education was elaborated during
the 1960s, chiefly at Berkeley and the Berkeley Center for Studies in Higher
Education (established in 1956). The defining moment in its ascendancy and
internationalisation was the 1973 OECD Conference on Future Structures of
Post-Secondary Education. The list of participants equated to the ‘Who’s Who?’
of Western higher education planning, research and management (OECD 1974:
175-186). Martin Trow had written on this issue during the 1960s and Daedalus
published the first widely influential article Reflections on the Transition from
Mass to Universal Higher Education (Trow 1970). At the OECD conference, he
delivered the keynote address, Problems in the Transition from Elite to Mass
Higher Education (Trow 1974). Thirty years later, he provided a summary
reflection on the era that he had had a hand in shaping, Reflections on the
Transition from Elite to Mass to Universal Access: Forms and Phases of Higher
Education in Modern Societies since WWII (Trow 2006).
The strategic critique concerns the slippage from description to prescription (cf.
Bourdieu 1991: 134-5; Fairclough 2005: 6) that occurs when advertising the
University of California and the Ivy League as an ideal solution. Moreover, the
stylisation of elite, mass and universal higher education as ideal types is not
warranted. Consequently, the explanatory and interpretive claims made with
regard to higher education participation, funding and access must critically be
reassessed.
Historically, US higher education is credited with being first in the transition from
elite to mass higher education with participation rising above 15% after WWII.
US higher education was also first in the transition to universal higher
education, by 1970, with participation reaching 50%. By comparison, earlier
historical role models such as England, France and Germany were struggling to
raise and fund participation beyond 15%. In 2000, about 2/3 of US higher
education expenditure came from private sources but very much less in France
and Germany, where virtually no private income was provided for state higher
education institutions. In the USA, private resources and the federal largesse in
research-funding and student aid programmes supported the rise of the private
elite research university and the public flagship research university. By 2000/1,
the federal government gave out US$ 37bn in student loans and US$ 8bn in
Pell grants - non-governmental sources made up less than 20% of roughly US$
75bn in student aid (Johnstone 2002).
8From elite to mass to universal higher education and back again: on historical
phases, functional differentiation and academic stratification
Martin Trow believes that the distinction between elite, mass and universal
higher education is valid and useful in both a diachronic and synchronic
dimension. Diachronically, Trow analyses the transition from elite to mass to
universal higher education as three distinct phases. Synchronically he assumes
a functional differentiation whereby elite higher education is maintained as, first,
mass and, then, universal participation sets in. Elite higher education is then
both the historic origin and contemporary pinnacle of academia.
To serve diachronic and synchronic analysis, Trow developed the notions of
elite, mass and universal higher education as ideal types (1974: 73). He posits
a logical interrelation of social and cultural elements, which would allow any
observer to reconstruct rationally the transition from one phase to the next as
well as the subsequent embedding of any national system and individual
institution. In a definite summary of the scheme, Trow (2006) approvingly cites
and utilises a table by Brennan (2004) that, in turn, was extrapolated from the
paper delivered to the OECD (Trow 1974).
In terms of principle, the identification of key elements as complementary would
allow the observer to explain both compatibility and strain with reference to the
ideal types. Ideal types would facilitate comparison between nation-states just
as among and inside institutions. Comparative explanation would be possible if
the Trowian distinctions did rationally reconstruct historical phases as well as
functional differentiation - but they do not. Trow abstracts participation rates,
functional differentiation, institutional stratification and the question of social
in/equality in one set of ideal types. In doing so, he conflates;
• participation with class, thereby assuming that the origin and destiny of
higher education is the elite university for the ruling class;
• differentiation with stratification, thereby advocating a segmented
hierarchy in which institutional mobility is pre-empted.
Table II - Trow’s conception of elite, mass and universal higher education
Elite (0-15%) Mass (16-50%) Universal (over 50%)
Attitudes to
access
A privilege of birth or
talent or both
A right for those with certain
qualifications
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Source: Trow (2006) and Brennan (2004), layout modified.
Trow has never acknowledged this conflation, but instead imputed a bias for
status and class to European higher education. When in the late 1970s
European participation rates were lagging behind US rates, Trow did re-
examine his ideal types (1978) but concluded that the transition to mass higher
education was delayed because European societies were so much more class-
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based. However, ‘elite’ higher education is a construct that exists only in
contrast to other strata; hence, the Trowian distinction has only two meanings:
Either it refers to;
 a distinction among universities or university departments according to
status, based on prestige, wealth and rank; or, else;
 the existence or capture of institutions to which the sons and daughters
of elite strata are sent.
One would expect that, over time, the two coincide.
Moreover, Brennan’s reconstructions of Trow’s distinctions show that Trowians
have no understanding of universal participation beyond the notion that this
ends any meaningful form of higher education. Mass participation is acceptable
to Trowians in the sense that at mass institutions knowledge may be
transmitted in modules to a diverse population that will go on to serve the
functional reproduction of society as managers; lawyers; engineers; doctors;
teachers; and so on. Nevertheless, universal higher education is envisioned as
the antithesis of the elite university. It the elite university is a homogenous
community that is in residence then, by contrast, universal higher education is
for anybody that intermittently attends class, preferably only virtually.
Consequently, instead of intensive and informal face-to-face interaction based
on shared and high academic standards, universal higher education is
unstructured, conducted at a distance, subject to the vagaries of mass public
opinion and only worth anything if it ‘adds value’. In this nightmare scenario of
universal participation, the elite university would seem to be well-advised to
seek exclusivity and seal itself off from ‘pollution’ by universal participation.
What remains is not sociological analysis but political advocacy. Trowians are
‘elitist reformers’, convinced of the desirability of an institutional hierarchy.  They
assume that traditionalist strategies of preserving the elite university are not
viable, especially not any that seeks to curtail participation (Trow 1974: 80;
1976, Kerr 1978: 273). In this scenario, rising participation and functional
differentiation must be accommodated, preferably, by having the government
legislate and fund a segmentation of institutions. Trowians view private elite
higher education as exceptional, dependent on large private sources of support.
If the insulation of the elite university were not possible, then the intermediary
strategy of Trowians would be to sustain elite enclaves in institutions and push
for highly selective graduate education.
The American Advantage? Reduced state funding, higher tuition fees and
poorer public higher education institutions
US higher education is assumed to have a comparative advantage because of
the greater diversity in institutional form, student body and income sources. This
advantage is ascribed structurally to institutional autonomy, budget autonomy,
strong leadership and a flat academic hierarchy. These structural components
were in place by 1900 (Trow 2000: 12-19), enabling a smooth progression from
elite to mass to universal higher education. By comparison, most European
systems faltered in the transition from elite to mass higher education in the
1970s – and, like Germany, France and Italy, have not recovered.
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US public higher education has led cost sharing with rising tuition fees and
expanding credit programmes. From the mid-1970s to 2000, state
appropriations for public institutions sank from 80% to 40% in real terms –
though appropriations per student increased from US$ 4,042 to 5,004 or by
23.8% (Ehrenberg 2003). Institutions diversified their income, with decreasing
instructional budgets despite rising tuition fees (Leslie/Slaughter 1997). The
overall trend for the years 1977 to 2001, including the 1990s, was for public
institutions to suffer compounded losses (Rizzo 2003). Specifically, for all 50
states, on average:
 The share of the public education budget in the state budget fell by 4%.
 The share allocated to public higher education in the education budget
fell by 6%.
 The share allocated directly to institutions (relative to indirect funding) fell
by 4%.
Institutional appropriations dropped by US$ 2,800 in real terms. Hence, even
though on average tuition fees were raised by US$ 1,700, public higher
education institutions by 2001 received US$ 1,100 less per FTE student in real
terms (Rizzo 2003).
3. Historical critique: the stratification of US elite institutions
US higher education leads the world at the beginning of the 21st century.
According to the OECD (2003), overall expenditure in 2000 at 2.7% GDP was
the highest. Expenditure on institutions per student was also the highest on
average at US$ 20,358 for all tertiary students. Canada and Korea spent 2.6%
GDP and Canada did spend US$ 16,690 per student on average in ‘Type A and
advanced research institutions’. But quite a few US ‘advanced research
institutions’ are able to spend more than US$ 40,000 annually per student from
their endowment income alone and some even above US$ 80,000. The only
country in which, on average, similar amounts per student were available to
‘advanced research institutions’, was Switzerland at US$ 19,491. Switzerland
spent US$ 106,282 per student over the average duration of studies (5.5
years), which is 50% more than the other big spenders, Germany (US$ 70,639
for 6.0 years) and Sweden (US$ 69,561 for 4.7 years). Consequently, in the
Times Higher Education Supplement (THES, 2004) world ranking six of the top
ten universities are US private elite research universities. 8 US public flagship
research universities make the top fifty. In the Shanghai Ranking (2005) 18
private elite research universities make the top fifty and 7 of these the top ten.
17 public flagship research universities make the top fifty, including all of the
University of California, save Irvine (at fifty-five).
When rigid stratification ends competition: the recent financial history of the Ivy
League
Faculty turnover, selectivity sweepstakes and university rankings are
understood as indicating a competitive market. The Carnegie classification (first
1970, latest 2005) suggests that ‘RU/VH’ – research universities with a very
high research activity - share a level playing field. ‘RU/VH’ are 96 of 4385
institutions (63 public, 33 private not-for-profit) enrolling approximately 2.4 of
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17.5 million students. Yet, the recent financial history of the Ivy League
suggests that stratification has become so rigid that
 an insurmountable gap has emerged, whereby public research
universities are no longer able to match the financial resources of the
private universities; and
 among the private universities, financial stratification has become so
marked as to limit competition severely.
During the 1990s, the Ivy League endowment value rose on average by 261%
(Ehrenberg/Smith 2001, the Consumer Price Index rose by 30.9%). While
differences in research and tuition income may partly account for the diverging
fortunes of US universities, it is the large difference in endowment values that
turns the stratification of institutions into a rigid hierarchy. In the mid-1990s,
faculty salaries at public research universities had already declined to less than
80% of the value at private research universities and were declining further
(Ehrenberg 2003). Moreover, while in 1970/71 private institutions spent about
US$ 4,700 more than public institutions per FTE student, this had risen in real
terms to over US$ 8,000 by 1995/96.
Yet even among the Ivy League institutions fortunes began to diverge sharply -
the differential in rising endowment value was between 181% for Columbia and
310% for Harvard. By 2000, the value of the endowment at Princeton, Harvard
and Yale was more than US$ 1 million per student, while at Brown, Dartmouth
and Pennsylvania it was less than US$ 200,000 (Ehrenberg/Smith 2001). As a
cumulative effect, the top three universities annually may spend twice as much
per FTE student (US$ 80,000) than the bottom three. As regards the faculty to
student ratio and institutional scholarships it seems that Brown, Dartmouth and
Pennsylvania are no longer in a position to match the top three. Moreover,
average faculty salaries have declined relatively from 95% to 80% of the value
at the top three.
As regards admission to the top ten percent of higher education institutions,
public or private, the over-representation of the children of affluent parents (top
income quartile) had increased steadily to more than 120% by 2000, meaning
that more than half of the freshmen and –women came from an affluent
background, compounded if both parents had a college degree. By contrast,
children from the two middle quartiles were under-represented by 36% and from
the bottom quartile by 50% (Astin/Oseguera 2004).
When segmented stratification curtails ambition: the consequences of the
California Master Plan
When the California legislature called for a Master Plan, Clark Kerr, then
President of the University of California (UC), won a referral to the Joint
Advisory Committee (JAC) of the Liaison Committee (of legislature and public
higher education), which consisted of university chancellors, state college
presidents and junior college representatives. Yet the initiative fell to the state
college delegation, which launched the ‘Love Plan’ (Malcolm Love, San Diego
State College President). Love proposed that the colleges become universities,
offer liberal and professional undergraduate education and postgraduate
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specialization, including the research doctorate. The University of California
should concentrate on advanced research. To block this proposal and regain
the initiative, Kerr had to replace all UC chancellors on JAC and shift the
negotiations to a newly-created venue, the Master Plan Survey Team, which
now included representatives of the private institutions (Douglass 2000: 265-
75).
Kerr’s vision prevailed. The segmentation of Californian public higher education
was made law. UC alone is able to award doctorates. It fully controls education
for law and medicine. It has access to the best 1/8 of high school graduates.
Eventually, the state colleges were upgraded by name to California State
University, but may award doctoral degrees only in conjunction with UC (or a
comparable private institution). CSU has access to the best 1/3 of high school
graduates. California’s higher education researchers view the Master Plan as a
success story, updated but never fundamentally altered in more than four
decades. While from 1958 to 2002 the Californian population grew by 130%,
the number of high school graduates rose by 299% and the number of BA/BS
awarded by 439%. Equity had been addressed by having UC and CSU enrol
students in a ratio of 40 juniors (Year 1 and 2) to 60 seniors (Year 3 and 4),
thereby reserving places for deserving ‘transfer’ students that moved up the
institutional ladder.
Yet, to preserve the core Master Plan tenet of high standards and quality at UC,
California has had to sacrifice the other tenets of access, equity and
affordability inside the public higher education system to an increasing extent.
Surveys and data show that:
- UC has regulated admission by privileging high school students that
have taken Advanced Placement Courses, but the expenses for these
courses are borne more readily by high schools in well-to-do
neighbourhoods.
- Transfers from Community Colleges to UC are likewise skewed in favour
of wealthier neighbourhoods thereby mitigating against higher education
careers of ‘poor but bright’ kids.
- Tuition fees at UC and CSU have been rising rapidly, mitigating against
the nominal public funded universal access provision of the Master Plan.
- Joint doctorate schemes between UC and CSU are the exception, thus
curtailing the institutional aspirations of CSU.
Clark Kerr himself called it a ‘disgrace’ (1999) that neither the transfer schemes
between the segments nor admission to UC are equitable, but correlate heavily
with class and consequently with ethnicity.
Conclusion: from government induced stratification to fair competition
The review of US higher education suggests that it is reasonable to worry about
the anti-competitive effects of US institutional stratification. One would query the
effect of the segmented and rigid stratification for the careers of students and
faculty, of ideas and research programmes. Yet it does not follow, that the US
elite university will fall. Rather, the US system of private elite and public
flagships universities entails that the rich will continue to get richer. Open is
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only, as institutional competition is stifled, whether US universities will continue
to be the best and most original in higher education and research.
The strategic and historical critique demonstrates that there is a window of
opportunity emerging for other countries and universities to create a more
innovative, efficient and equitable system of encouraging participation and
sharing costs for higher education. The impasse reached in the USA reveals by
implication the two necessary pre-conditions:
- Universities and higher education institutions more generally must be
granted legal and financial autonomy on equal terms so that competition
ensues (instead of stratification by segmentation); and
- The state must regulate the competition to foster diversification and
specialisation but dampen institutional stratification (to avoid that any
stratification becomes rigid beyond a point of no return).
4. Situational critique: national cost sharing by tuition fees and income
contingent loans
Human capital theory, launched in the 1960s, replaced manpower planning
approaches to higher education. In this economic perspective on education and
labour, higher education is something that states, parents and students invest in
for the sake of a return. It is a staple of the OECD and the World Bank that the
rate of return remains significant even with the onset of universal higher
education. Students are seen as bearers of educational, cultural and social
capital. Indeed, talk of social capital legitimises both the expansion of tertiary
education and the exclusivity of elite university alumni networks. Moreover,
critics of capitalist class society also buy into the notion of human capital, the
idea of accumulation and the assumption of convertibility, only that they focus
on the unequal rates of return and the perpetuation of class advantage.
Cost-sharing by means of tuition fees has had two defining moments. The first
moment was the 1980s tuition fee hike of Ivy League universities and, more
generally, of the US elite private and public research universities, based on
high-tuition/high-aid policy and needs-blind admission. The second moment
was the 1989 introduction of the Higher Education Contribution Scheme
(HECS) in Australia, based on a national system with the option of deferred
payment by an income-contingent loan, subsequently implemented with
variations in New Zealand and England. Both models are seen as reinforcing
academic quality while not per se reinforcing class advantage. However, data
for US elite universities indicates that class advantage is reinforced. Moreover,
it seems legitimate to worry that the effects of US institutional stratification
principally threaten the quality of research and education. So, which are the
effects of the Australian HECS and its emulation elsewhere?











Government 40% 60% 44% 32%
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Tuition fees 38% 22% 23% 18%
Other income 22% 18% 33% 50%
Source: Davis (2004)
Bruce Chapman (1988, 2001, 2006a,b) was influential in shaping the Australian
HECS and has since evaluated and defended its implementation. Nicholas Barr
(1993, 2004, 2005) was influential in shaping the reformed English system of
top-up fees. Comparing tuition fee systems, he has most clearly articulated the
rationale for universal, differential and deferred charging. The Ford Foundation
has sponsored international research on higher education finance and
accessibility at The Center for Comparative and Global Studies in Education,
The State University of New York (Buffalo). The director, D. Bruce Johnstone,
had first written on income contingent loans in 1972 (cf. Johnstone 1972, 1986,
2003).
The situational critique focuses on the introduction of universal tuition fees as a
sub-optimal solution. Chapman, Barr, Johnstone and colleagues are mistaken
about the logic of the situation (cf. Thomas & Thomas 1928: 572, Merton 1995).
A national tuition fee system would have been adequate for advanced industrial
nations that seek to push higher education beyond 20% and 30% - what the
Trowians term the transition from elite to mass higher education. But, once
universal and recurrent higher education sets in, the unintended consequences
question the feasibility of national tuition fee systems in the medium-term, while
undermining the efficiency and equity claimed for universal tuition fees already
in the short term.
The move to tuition fees and income contingent loans since the mid-1970s
By the late 1970s, OECD countries had distinct patterns of higher education
funding and state subsidies. Most countries had a single sector that was either
statist, as in northern and western Europe, or public-autonomous but
nevertheless state funded, as in Australia, New Zealand and the UK (Levy
1982). Dual sectors, public and private, prevailed in Belgium, Canada and the
Netherlands, but both were mostly state-funded. One significant exception was
the USA. Another significant exception was Japan, where the private
universities had the majority of enrolments and were funded privately. Overall,
OECD states funded all public higher education study places as well as offering
students direct aid in the form of grants and subsidised loans, and indirect aid in
the form of housing  and subsidised transport and food as well as tax relief
(Blaug and Woodhall 1978).
Since then, the trend has been to introduce and raise tuition fees and switch
from grants to loans. Economists provided the diagnosis that higher education
is under-funded, student support inadequate and access inequitable. They also
advised that differential tuition fees should be introduced and income contingent
loans supplied to cover tuition fees and living costs. Economists want more
‘market’, envisioning universities as sellers and students as buyers. Yet, they
also perceive a ‘market failure’ for student borrowing. Hence they advocate
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government intervention to create price signals by tuition fees backed by a
scheme for income contingent loans that are collected by the tax office.
Income-contingent loan schemes provide default protection and consumption
smoothing. ‘Income contingency’ is a superior solution when compared to a
graduate tax or an investment loan (e.g. for business start-ups or to buy
property). A graduate tax is not compatible with the internationalisation of higher
education as it may be collected only with great difficulty from graduates that
leave the state. The investment loan is inefficient, inequitable and unethical. It is
inefficient because the absence of collateral makes the loan expensive. It is
inequitable as lenders must wish to restrict lending to cohorts that are
presumed to have a low default risk, leading to even higher interest rates for
others as well socially sub-optimal levels of investment in higher education.
Moreover, the commercial bank becomes the owner of the labour power and
this is morally repugnant as it threatens a relegation to the poor house in the
case of low income or default.
In income-contingent loan schemes the risk might be pooled among the
creditors or, else, shared with the state or the university. Risk-pooling requires a
mandatory scheme across universities. Otherwise adverse selection and moral
hazard will defeat the scheme, as Yale University learned in the 1970s (Nerlove
1975, Chapman 2005). Adverse selection means that universities and students
with the greatest financial resources would opt out of any voluntary scheme,
making it more expensive. Moral hazard means that those in need of the
scheme have an incentive to minimise their declared income after study by, for
example, seeking benefits in kind from employers. Risk-pooling among students
would require government regulation in favour of a compulsory scheme.
Risk-sharing income-contingent loan schemes do not require compulsion.
Economists point out that these provide insurance against uncertain outcomes.
The greater a student’s uncertainty as regards future income and the greater
the risk aversion, the more optimal becomes a risk-sharing income-contingent
loan scheme. Economists also point to model calculations that show that these
schemes increase welfare not only as compared to commercial bank loans but
also to up-front fees. There are incentives for all, including the children of
affluent parents, to join the scheme. Economists think that income-contingent
loan schemes are currently the best instrument to break the nexus between the
socio-economic standing of the parents and the life chances of the children,
leading to greater equality of opportunity in times when the income gap is
increasing between those with higher education and those without.
The national system: design, alterations and consequences of tuition fees with
income contingent loan schemes
In Australia, the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) began in 1989
with a flat fee of AUS$ 1,800 with no real rate of interest, indexed to the
Consumer Price Index. Payment was deferred on an income-contingent basis
until after graduation and subject to a threshold below which no payment was
required. Age cohort participation increased from 24% in 1988 to 38% in 1999.
Chapman (2001) and colleagues (Chapman and Ryan 2005) have collected
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data to show that HECS had no adverse effect on access. Relatively, children
from low-income families were as likely or unlikely to go to university as before.
Indubitably, more went because of the overall rise in participation. Moreover,
HECS enabled choice - as indicated by the doubling of women’s participation to
more than 40% of the age cohort. Likewise, the effect on internal rates of return
was estimated to be no larger than a decrease of 1.5% (Borland 2001,
Chapman and Ryan 2002), with representative rates of return still above 12.5%
for women and 13% for men. Economists hold that this decrease is not
substantial enough to deter prospective students as income advantages are still
substantial, but that tuition fees are progressive because the general tax payer
pays less and the beneficiaries of higher education contribute to investment
costs. In the face of government parsimony and a demographic bulge, HECS
enabled a rapid, unprecedented and exemplary expansion of higher education.
Simultaneously, the fee-charging Australian university established itself as a
new and major international destination.
Table IV - Australian higher education expansion and internationalisation 1989 to 2002










1989 441 074 21 112 (5%) 81.7% - 5.9% 12.5%
2002 896 621 185 058
(21%)
44.1% 16.7% 21.2% 18%
Source: Davis (2004)
HECS provides default protection and consumption smoothing. Yet its history
has been neither efficient nor equitable. Not only is interest subsidised to zero
while studying, but in due course parliament also legislated that:
 Universities were entitled to charge whatever fee up-front to
undergraduates not accepted into HECS and these places were capped,
relative to HECS places, at 25% (1998) and then 35% (2003);
 Universities were entitled to charge whatever fee up-front for
postgraduate degrees by teaching but not by research until the 1998
introduction of a Postgraduate Education Loan Scheme (PELS).
Parliament created a class system in which the students in the public class
were subsidised twice over: By having their study place subsidised and
receiving an interest subsidy on their loan. ‘Public’ students were paying
roughly 1/3 of the cost of study, while the others had to pay 100%.
Moreover, parliament arbitrarily introduced changes such as;
 increasing charges by 40% in one year;
 lowering the threshold for repayment by 30% in one year; and
 switching from uniform charges to differential charging and assigning
one course with low costs (law) into the highest band and one course
with high costs into the lowest band (nursing).
Implementation of the economists’ policy advice led to an inefficient and
inequitable outcome. Economists tend to blame politicians, but the error is with
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the economists’ assumptions. Economists envision higher education as a
market – if not existing, then to be created. Yet, economists also diagnose a
market failure because the buyer wishing to invest in her or his human capital is
short of funds and cannot find a source from which to lend – at least not at
reasonable cost for lack of collateral and the associated uncertainty of future
earnings and default risk. Hence economists call for government intervention in
setting price signals and providing income-contingent loans. The mistaken
assumptions are as follows:
1. Economists imagine the student only as buyer, consumer and creditor,
but not as voter. Yet, if the loan scheme is successful, there rapidly will
be an increasingly large number of creditors who are tax-paying
graduates.
2. Economists’ models show a market failure in providing funds, but it is
unclear if there is a market failure and, even if there is one, whether this
is a case for government intervention, either directly assuming the role of
the bank or, else, securing the debts by shouldering the default risk.
3. Higher education is conceptualised as a market of sellers and buyers,
whereas it is a set of contracts that involve the higher education
institution, the student and the government – and possibly parents,
alumni and other parties.
Economists have not been interested enough to investigate the unintended
consequences of their prescription. As creditors and voters, students are
interested in a subsidy. Interest rate subsidies are a case in point. Any
economist, I suppose, would anticipate the following consequences: The
interest subsidy means that the significant portion of the loan is not repaid, thus
off-loading costs onto the general taxpayer. This redistribution benefits mainly
successful mid-career professionals (those least in need). This impedes the
quality of university education as the funds devoted to subsidising students
restrict the state funds available for institutions. Moreover, the interest subsidy
invites even those students who are not in need of a loan to take out this loan
and invest it to make a profit. This directly exacerbates inequalities among
students, as those who are sponsored by their parents may use the funds to
augment their wealth. It also impedes access to higher education as loans
become expensive and thus will be rationed and too small, thus forcing the
financially most vulnerable students to work.
Conclusion: from government intervention to university self-organisation
The situational critique advanced here leads to the conclusion that there is no
case for:
 Government intervention in supplying income-contingent loans, not even
for living expenses.
 Taxpayer subsidies to income-contingent loan schemes, as the default
risk may be shared by universities, banks and students and controlled by
the admission procedure and interest rate.
 Political-bargaining and subsidising of interest, for the state would
privilege only the already affluent while restricting the resources available
for widening access to higher education and improving education more
generally.
19
 Government setting of tuition fee levels, which is all the more problematic
if there are capped fees for home students but free fee levels for
overseas students as this is an incentive for universities to offer places
first to overseas students who will pay a higher fee.
Logically and empirically the case for cost-sharing is compelling. Tuition fees
backed by an income-contingent loan scheme will deliver an internally efficient
and equitable outcome if higher education is understood as a contract between
the institution, student and government. The negotiation of tuition fees and their
payment should be left to the institution and student. Government must only
regulate that student have access to income contingent loan schemes that
cover ‘out-of-pocket’ costs fully and that payment is collected through the tax
office. What will then emerge is not a market for higher education, but a market
for education loans among lending institutions – a market regulated to provide
default protection and consumption smoothing for students.
In Australia, New Zealand and England higher education participation increased
late. Yet, cost-sharing has enabled them to become leaders in providing
access. Universal tuition fees were easier to implement as three year
undergraduate degrees were the norm. However, with the rise of knowledge
society and culture, a new situational logic prevails, which finds expression in
the global harmonisation of the degree structure as Bachelor, Master and
Doctorate. The new parameters are:
1. More than 50% of the age grade transition to higher education.
2. More and more study five years and longer.
3. Recurrent enrolment for further professional and research degrees
becomes the norm.
In the age of universal higher education there is a case for creating two
divergent higher education financing regimes. For the European Higher
Education Area such a dual regime, whereby the state funds access to
undergraduate degrees but does not contribute to professional postgraduate
degrees, is explored.
5. European opportunities in meeting demand for higher education
In Europe, higher education participation and quality have been sacrificed as
states obstructed investment in higher education by not allowing student
demand and choice to lead supply. Even if the state vows to raise and fund
participation above 50% of the age grade while maintaining entrance exams
and providing a generous mix of grants and loans to cover living expenses,
demand, choice and quality are in jeopardy. In Sweden, a case that may serve
as a benchmark, the state committed in 1993 to expanding participation to 50%
on the basis of offering each student a combination of a fully-funded study place
(with expenditure per student roughly double that of Australia, New Zealand and
the UK) with an individual stipend and loan that covers living expenses for up to
six years. However, this combination of state supply and selection had the
following effects in the decade after the 1993 reform (Forneng 2003, Kim 2005):
• On average more than 1/3 of applicants were rejected at each round of
admission, with a peak of more than 1/2 in 1997.
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• Delayed entry and student accumulation strategies resulted increasing
numbers of first-year students being over 25; eventually even more than
50%.
• Drop-outs, programme change and exit into the labour market before
degree completion cumulatively depressed the completion rate to below
50%.
The Bologna process: Differentiating undergraduate from postgraduate
education
In Europe, the funding and regulation of higher education is under discussion.
Tuition fees are being introduced and the Bologna signatory states have
committed to a new system of university degrees based on the Bachelor,
Master and Doctorate. In the context of rising participation and recurrent higher
education, a distinction may be drawn between universal higher education (1st
cycle) and continuing and recurrent master education that provides professional
qualifications or prepares for a research degree (2nd cycle). More than 75 000
doctorates (3rd cycle) are awarded annually, most of these are research
doctorates but an increasing number are new, professional doctorates.
Table V - Participation, overall expenditure, cost sharing and indirect funding in the EU-6 (with the
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M 43 / F 51
1.1% (All) 27.2% 05.3%
France 37










M 31 / F 33
1.4% (All) 11.8% 17.3%
Source: OECD (2004) Education at a Glance, data for 2001 or 2002.
For much of Europe participation and funding is too low, particularly in Austria;
Belgium; the Czech Republic; France; Germany; Italy; and Switzerland.
Economists and sociologists in the know about the emerging global knowledge
society and culture, as well as the OECD secretariat and the European
Commission, anticipate that low participation and lack of funds will have an
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adverse effect on economic growth and life chances, innovation and social
cohesion.
Trowian corporate actors envision the European Higher Education Area (EHEA)
as an opportunity to create a European ‘Ivy League’ or as a space in which a
tripartite model as in California might be instituted. As regards ‘Ivy League’
aspirations one need look no further than the talk about the ‘European Institute
of Technology’ and special funding measures in Germany to create ‘elite’
universities. As regards the imitation of California, the UK government, for
example, has been pushing for institutional stratification with a combination of
measures; such as evaluation-based funding that redirects monies to ‘elite’
departments; top-up fees that permit differential charging; and the vertical
integration of further education colleges as feeder institutions (foundation
degrees).
The new ‘Europe of Knowledge’ requires regulation, in the first instance, to
foster the emergence of a ‘playing field’ between institutions, whatever their
specific mix of research and teaching activities. It is too much to hope that this
emerging European playing field will be level, given national legislation and
regional disparities in wealth, but if a single playing field is to emerge at all, this
requires the setting of field boundaries and playing rules that favour institutional
competition for diversification and specialisation. However, to follow the
Trowians would mean that Europe would be stuck with a rigid institutional
stratification as in the USA but on a much lower level of funding and quality that
will stifle institutional competition and dash the aspirations of both faculties and
students.
Cost-sharing approaches are being adopted across Europe. In England, tuition
fees of up to £3000 have been legalised. More typical is the situation in Austria
and Germany where some public institutions are entitled to charge up to €1000,
some are not (some German Länder) and some are subsidised so that they
need or may not charge (some Austrian Fachhochschulen). The backdrop is a
previous strong normative consensus that state education should be provided
free of charge. However, as the state sector is under-funded and thus lacks
capacity and quality, across much of central and eastern Europe a private
tuition-charging sector has emerged – within or separate from public
institutions. The appellation 'university' is normally withheld from private higher
education institutions by the state and to earn their keep such institutions must
focus on the subjects with the lowest teaching cost and highest potential
postgraduate income, such as law and management.
In the new Europe of Knowledge, cost-sharing for higher education requires
regulation. It would need to be equitable for the students and efficient in its
incentives for universities. The outcome must be socially progressive and not
disadvantageous for those with lower lifetime incomes. Moreover, the European
Higher Education Area requires that any scheme encourage mobility. Further
still, it should provide incentives for institutional competition and diversification
within the European playing field.
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Europe could allow demand to lead supply while raising the quality of higher
education if more resources flow. However, if they were merely to flow into
national systems as they are, the investment will most likely not pay off, at least
not in the sense of contributing to the new Europe of Knowledge. However, the
Bologna process enables a strategic decision to decouple postgraduate from
undergraduate funding for;
A. Universal, open and state funded undergraduate degree programmes
(BA); and,
B. Internationalised postgraduate education (MA, PhD) that universities
conduct of their own accord and for which no direct state funding should
be available.
This strategic recommendation for Europe is consonant with insights gained by
the ‘New Millennium Project on Higher Education Costs, Pricing, and
Productivity’, which updated the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education
1973 tuition policy framework for the USA (Wellman 2001). It is emphasised
that not only institutional cost and nominal tuition fees matter, but also, for the
student, the ‘out-of-pocket’ cost of studying as well as the foregone income.
Public benefits are greatest at entry-level. Hence, there is a clear rationale not
to charge tuition fees for the BA. Students would anyway be expected to cover
their ‘out-of-pocket’ costs for which loan, grant and aid packages should be
available that ensure that students may concentrate on their degree. Put
another way, asking students to take out loans, even if income-contingent, to
pay for tuition fees and living expenses across the 1st, 2nd and 3rd cycle would
be to saddle graduates with disproportionate debt. As participation crosses the
50% threshold and continuing professional development spreads, charging from
the first semester would be neither efficient nor equitable. In any student cohort
it would disproportionately privilege ‘rich kids’ and for the society at large it
would lead to sub-optimal levels of investment in higher education, especially in
advanced degrees.
For Bologna signatory states a strategic decision to decouple undergraduate
from postgraduate funding would be goal-rational in the following sense:
C. Societies and their states may position themselves in the knowledge
society by publicly funding wider access to undergraduate education
(BA) to push participation rates above 50%.
D. European universities, individually, obtain responsibility for the
postgraduate education (MA, PhD) they conduct and are thus enabled to
compete with the best universities in the world.
Such a strategic distinction would salvage and revitalise the best of the
European university tradition, such as the commitment to a disciplinary and
rigorous undergraduate education, the advanced research seminar that initiates
postgraduate research careers and professional postgraduate education that
exceeds the demands and expectations of employers.
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Recommendations for financing postgraduate education and undergraduate
studies
Professional higher education has become highly competitive.  State, public
and private universities that charge full tuition fees may recruit their students
without capacity constraints. New providers are emerging - such as corporate
universities and professional schools, supported by business, foundations and
governments. Given the difference between academic and professional
education and the rise of recurrent postgraduate education, the
recommendations are as follows:
1. States should withdraw from any direct governance and funding of
postgraduate education;
2. Universities must be free to set fees but also obliged to provide an
income contingent loan;
3. Students must be able to draw on an income contingent loan that covers
tuition and living expenses in full;
4. States should offer to collect the income-contingent loans through the tax
office insofar as they offer default protection and consumption
smoothing;
5. For postgraduate research degrees additional funding should be
available from a diversity of sources such as research councils,
foundations, benefactors and the university itself.
6. Any university should have available as additional financial instruments:
the reverse generation contract, research fellowship, teaching fellowship,
contract research and employer funding.
Undergraduate studies must increasingly be secured through a universal
access provision. If for advanced countries it is desirable to have participation
rates of 50% and higher, then there is a case for the state funding of study
places. States should reconsider and commit to providing a fully funded study
place to anyone who may benefit from higher education. While such a
commitment is costly, it is suggested that, rather than curtail demand, states
rather refrain from subsidising living expenses, which for undergraduates could
be covered by income-contingent loan schemes too. Assuming a single and
open space of higher education, the recommendations are the following:
1. Demand should be met and any barriers to the supply of study places
and living expenses lifted;
2. Demand should be funded according to output with stringent external
quality control of degree standards and results;
3. Output-funding should cover the costs of the study place fully while living
expenses would be funded by income-contingent loans;
4. Governments should refrain from engaging in grant provision and merit
aid for undergraduate living expenses, although third parties may wish
and should be allowed to do so (e.g. foundations, trade unions,
employers);
5. Student choice of institution and degree programme must be respected,
thus the money must follow the student;
6. The money should follow the student.
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